Today is the 1st death anniversary of Raul M. Gonzalez (03 December 1930 - 07 September 2014). Below is an excerpt of his unpublished autobiography. He talks about his opposition to the conduct of a plebiscite, under the Martial Law regime, to ratify what became the 1973 Constitution.
“The Constitutional Convention that Pres.
Ferdinand Marcos was able to control through intimidation and bribery finished its final drafting, by November 27, 1972, of what was to become the 1973 Constitution. A couple of days later Marcos issued
Proclamation no. 73 for the holding of a plebiscite on January 15, 1973 for the ratification of the Constitution .
“I knew that there was no stopping Marcos
once the new Constitution was ratified in whatever manner. The stopping of the planned plebiscite became
imperative in my mind. I wrote a plea
for injunction to the holding of the plebiscite, and filed it at the Supreme
Court in the afternoon of December 1, 1972.
I cited the following reasons to support my plea to declare
Proclamation 73 invalid.
“First, Marcos did not have the power to
call for a plebiscite as the 1935 Constitution states that only Congress can
authorize the holding of a plebiscite.
“Second, Marcos did not have the power to
appropriate funds to underwrite the holding of a plebiscite. Citing Article VI, Section 23 (2) of the 1935
Constitution, it states: No money shall
be paid out of the Treasury except in the pursuance of an appropriation made by
law. I asserted that since Congress still existed,
only Congress could allocate the 15 million pesos needed to hold a
plebiscite.
“I
hinted at the abuse in the exercise of powers made under Martial Law Proclamation 1081 when
I wrote: the extraordinary powers which
should be exercised under a valid martial law proclamation should also be
limited to those acts and decrees which have a direct bearing to invasion,
insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger thereof, nothing more.
“I reasoned that the president was going
against the very precepts and principles which allowed him to exercise his
powers. In my motion for an injunction,
I wrote: But the question may be raised: if
his powers as such are only co-terminus with the existence of the emergency
(Araneta vs. Dinglasan) can he still validly exercise such power – even to call
for a plebiscite if there is no more emergency as the state itself claims that
peace has been restored, that, according to the Secretary of National Defense,
‘the government has already completely dismantled the armed groups in this
country’? Besides, as long as we submit
that the Constitution is paramount, then, even the Commander-in-Chief remains
bound by it. Consequently, he may not
validly legislate, by decree, to set aside funds of the Treasury in
contravention with what the Constitution postulates.
“The third reason I stated in my prayer for
an injunction was that the exercise of the plebiscite itself would become null
because the people were under duress.
The Supreme Court laid down the precedent when in 1971 Sen. Arturo
Tolentino proposed to hold a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. The Supreme Court said that the voter must be
provided with sufficient time for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the
amendment, and its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which
it has to form a harmonious whole.
“I wrote in my motion that, if in 1971, the
Court held the Tolentino proposal to be an improper submission – when we had
then a free and untrammeled press, when there was unlimited use of the airwaves
in order to reach the maximum number of voters, when there was no prior censorship
over media, when people did not have to whisper their inner feelings in bated
breaths, when citizens had no fear of an ever constant threat that one
indiscreet remark might lead to an invitation to Camp Crame, how much more was
the Marcos proposal improper.
“I also pointed out the high stakes
involved by asserting that the ratification of the Constitution would likely determine the future of the country for the next 50 years. I insisted that the people were not in that
state of tranquility to properly reflect on the various facets of the proposed
Constitution because of the many dangers that are poised to strike them under
the veil of martial law.
“My fourth reason was that the 45 days
provided by Pres. Marcos was not enough for the public to study and to engage
in dialogues and debates on the proposed Constitution. I saw no reason for the haste with which the
government was carrying out its agenda.
Would the State be destroyed if we would not approve a new Constitution
in 45 days?
“My fifth and final reason for opposing the
holding of the plebiscite was the serious accusation that the Constitutional
Convention had been gravely compromised by Martial Law. I pointed out that, after September 23, 1972,
the deliberations of the Convention took a much faster pace, whereas before the
arrests of anti-Marcos personalities, matters like deciding on what language the Constitution would be
framed took as long as a month. I
underscored the fact that the Convention had been trimmed into a partisan body
after members of the anti-Marcos forces were jailed.”
